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Hanna v. Plumer offers more predictability about the conduct of a
case in a federal court on diversity grounds, and possibly more hope
for the proponents of the Federal Rules. The big question now is what
would happen if the application of a Federal Rule dearly defeats the
purpose of a state rule in a situation in which there is a compelling
reason for having federal uniform procedure. The principal case did
not pose this problem, thus the Federal Rules policy of uniform pro-
cedure among federal courts won the first round by default.
RONALD W. MOORE
LAWYER COUNSEL IN SPECIAL COURTS-MARTIAL
Private First Class James E. Stapley, United States Army, was
tried before a special court-martial for violation of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, Articles 86, 9 o , 117, 123 and 134.1 He was found
guilty of all charges and specifications and sentenced to confinement at
hard labor for three months, forfeiture of pay of $55.00 per month for
six months, and reduction in rank.
Stapley's conviction was brought to the United States District
Court for the District of Utah on a petition for a writ of habeas corp-
us, Application of Stapley.2 The accused 3 when initially served with
the charges requested that a lawyer be appointed to defend him. His
request was denied; an Army captain with about two years of military
service was appointed his defense counsel and a second lieutenant
with about one year of military service was appointed his assistant
defense counsel. Neither defense counsel nor assistant defense counsel
had ever participated in a court-martial, and neither had received any
tection and uniformity of procedure is due in part to the discrepancy between
state and federal procedure. As each state draws closer to the federal norm the
possibilities of conflict are reduced proportionally. If the present trends in state
procedure continue, the eventual adoption of the Federal Rules by all or almost all
of the states could make the possibilities of conflict minute enough to make the
problem moot.
'The Uniform Code of Military Justice is contained in so U.S.C. §§ 801-940,
and will be cited as UCMJ, UCMJ. art. 86, absence without leave; UCMJ, art. go as-
saulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer; UCMJ, art. 17 pro-
voking speech or gestures; UCMJ, art. 123, forgery; UCMJ, art. 134, general article
(prejudice to the good order and discipline of the service or discrediting the
service).
2246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
"The defendant in court-martial cases is termed the accused.
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formal legal training.4 The accused contended that failure to provide
lawyer counsel was a denial of his constitutional right to counsel, hence
deprived the special court-martial of jurisdiction.
In granting the writ of habeas corpus, the court held: (1) Stap-
ley's court-martial was a mere ceremony performed according to
script and that the accused's representation by appointed counsel did
not, in fact or in law, constitute representation by counsel, civilian or
military;5 (2) the minimal requirements of due process and the dictates
of the Sixth Amendment are not satisfied by the appointment of de-
fense counsel with no legal training or knowledge;6 and (3) the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of the right to the assistance of counsel "ap-
plies to proceedings before special courts-martial ... particularly where
the charges are substantial or involved moral turpitude or may result
in a substantial deprivation of liberty."7
The accused is assured by the Uniform Code of Military Justice of
the right to counsel in a general or special court-martial.8 A combina-
tion of the Uniform Code and decisions of the United States Court of
Military Appeals require that all counsel in a general court-martial
be lawyer counselY But a right to lawyer counsel is not extended to
the special court-martial.' 0 In special courts-martial any officer, not
disqualified by reason of prior participation in the case, may be ap-
pointed as trial or defense counsel.11
Special courts-martial have jurisdiction to try any non-capital of-
fense made punishable by the Uniform Code and may impose the fol-
lowing maximum punishments: (1) bad-conduct discharge, if a ver-
batim record is kept by a court-appointed reporter; (2) six months con-
finement at hard labor; (3) forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month
"Defense counsel was assigned approximately one week before the trial and
spent several days studying the Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-
Martial ... and there is no doubt that both he and the assistant defense counsel
were in good faith in attempting to properly handle the case." Application of Stap-
ley, supra note 2, at 319.
3Id. at 319-20.
Old. at 321.
"Id. at 320. (Emphasis added.)
8UCMJ, art. 38(b). "The accused has the right to be represented in his defense
before a general or special court-martial by civilian counsel if provided by him, or
by military counsel of his own selection if reasonably available, or by the defense
counsel detailed under section 827 of this title (article 27)."
UCMJ, art. 27(b); United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 26 C.M.R.
387 (1958).
10UCMJ, art. 27(c); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, i95i. 6c (here-
inafter cited MCM, '951); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R.
411 (1963).
2tUCMJ, art. 27(a); MCM, 1951), 6c; See Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528, 531
(gth Cir. 1943); cert denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943).
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for six months; (4) reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade.12 In
practice special courts function primarily in the areas of larceny and
related offenses, robbery, and other aggravated assaults. The annual
statistics show that special courts are numerous. In 1959, the Army
tried 20,28713 cases by "special court," and the Navy tried 14,77041
such cases. The large number of special courts combined with the
need for more lawyers in the military15 indicates the possible problem
the military would encounter if lawyer counsel were mandatory in
special courts.
There has already been important reaction to Stapley: (i) on
November 1, 1965 a petitioner, relying on Stapley, was denied a writ
of habeas corpus when the court held that Stapley was limited to its
facts; 16 (2) the Department of Justice has announced that Stapley will
not be appealed; 17 and (3) "the several armed forces read the decision
in the Stapley case to hold simply that there must be effective represen-
tation of an accused before a court-martial, not that the counsel of
the accused must be a member of the bar of some civilian jurisdic-
tion."'
8
Before considering the substantive aspect of Stapley, it is necessary
to discuss the district court's action in deciding Constitutional issues
in a military prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus.
In Burns v. Wilson,19 the United States Supreme Court limited the
review power of federal courts in court-martial cases to (i) an inquiry
concerning the jurisdiction of the court-martial over the offense
charged, the person tried, and the punishment given; and (2) a de-
termination of whether the accused's basic rights had been fully and
fairly considered by the court-martial.20 Consistent with these limita-
tions, numerous decisions2 ' indicate that the inquiry into the juris-
22USMJ, art. 19, MGM, 1951, s5b. In addition a punitive letter may be, but
rarely is, included in the punishment.
21396o C.M.A. &- J.A.G. Ann. Rep. 251-52.
4196o J.A.G. of the Navy Ann. Rep. 3. There are also indications that special
courts-martial are being used increasingly to try "serious-type" offenses in the
Navy. Id.
15Id. at 3-4; sg6o J.A.G. of the Air Force Ann. Rep. 4.
"6LeBallister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965).
2"Richmond Times-Dispatch, Dec. 1, 1965, p. 13, col 4. "But department sources
said the decision by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall-partially based on a
Pentagon recommendation-should not be interpreted as requiring a revamping
of the uniform code of military justice [sic] . Id.
"sLetter from M. A. Larkin, Captain, U.S. Navy, Director, Military Justice
Division, to Robert E. Payne, Dec. 13, 1965.
"346 U.S. 137 (1953).
2Id. at 144, 146.
"E.g., Burns v. Harris, 340 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1965): Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d
17 (4th Cir. ig6i); Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15 (1oth Cir. 1959).
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diction of the court-martial includes "an examination of the accused's
Constitutional rights but only to see that the military courts have
given due consideration to guarantees afforded by the Constitution." 22
The Stapley court was precisely within these limitations in its dis-
cussion of the accused's right to counsel, and it explicitly confined its
judgment accordingly.2 3 The court held that the practice of denying
as a rule rather than as an exception the benefit of lawyer counsel con-
stituted sufficient failure to consider the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to oust the court-martial of jurisdiction.
2 4
The theory that denial of a Constitutional right deprives a court
of jurisdiction consequently authorizing a federal court to hear a pe-
tition of habeas corpus is frequently used in the civilian sphere,25 and
it is the well-established ground upon which federal courts hear peti-
tions from military prisoners.26
To determine the validity of Stapley and the reaction to it, one
must examine the relation between military due process and constitu-
tional due process.
It has been authoritatively asserted that the original intent of the
Bill of Rights encompassed the rights of the accused in courts-mar-
tial.2 7 Henderson contends that the history of both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments indicates that these two amendments are applicable to
courts-martial except, of course, the provisions for presentment and
indictment by grand jury and for jury trial.28 He also asserts that the
remainder of the Bill of Rights is similarly applicable to courts-
martial.2
9
This position has been assailed as reading history and the law with
"hindsight" and applying contemporary concepts to the facts of the
past.3 0 Weiner traces the development of the Bill of Rights in relation
to early court-martial practice in England and the United States and
concludes that the Bill of Rights was not intended by the framers to
be applicable to courts-martial.31
'Palomera v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 937, 939 (loth Cir. 1965).
'Application of Stapley, supra note 2, at 320.
21Id. at 322.
'E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
!"E.g., Day v. Wilson, 247 F.2d 6o, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Dixon v. United
States, 237 F.2d 509 (loth Cir. 1956); Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760 (loth Cir. 1954).
'Henderson, Courts-Martial and The Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 293 (1957).
1Id. at 303-15.
-1Id. at 321-23.
,Veiner, Courts-Martial and The Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 1,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1958).
'lId. at 42-49. Weiner gives particular emphasis to the right to counsel.
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It is currently understood that the rights of the accused in courts-
martial are Congressional in origin, not Constitutional. 32 Neverthe-
less, the United States Court of Military Appeals, the highest mili-
tary appellate tribunal, has equated what it terms "military due pro-
cess" with "constitutional due process" to such an extent that it is
difficult to delineate the two as separate concepts. In United States v.
Clay,33 the Court initially framed the concept of military due process,
saying:
A cursory inspection of the Uniform Code of Military Justice...
discloses that Congress granted to an accused the following
rights which parallel those accorded to defendants in civilian
courts: to be informed of the charges against him;34 to be con-
fronted by witnesses testifying against him; 3  to cross-examine
witnesses for the government; to challenge members of the court
for cause or peremptorily; 36 to have a specified number of
members compose general and special courts-martial; 37 to be
represented by counsel;33 not to be compelled to incriminate
himself;39 to have involuntary confessions excluded from con-
sideration; 0 to have the court instructed on the elements of the
offense, the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof;4 ' to be found guilty of an offense only when a designated
number of members concur in a finding to that effect;42 to be
sentenced only when a certain number of members vote in the
affirmative; 43 and to have an appellate44 review.
45
The court added that, although rights and privileges of the ac-
cused are based on "laws as enacted by Congress,"4 6 they would be
2U.S. Const. art. s, § 8; United States v. Culp, 14 US.C.M.A. 199, 3 C.M.R.
411 (196 3); United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 6o7, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958);
United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (ig5i). The United States
Supreme Court has held that its power to review courts-martial decision is limited
to habeas corpus proceedings in situations in which violations of the accused's
rights are so patently a denial of due process as to deprive the court-martial of
jurisdiction. Burns v. Wilson, 246 U.S. 137 (1953). See Avins, Accused's Right to
Defense Counsel Before a Military Court, 42 U. Det. L.J. 21 (1964).





-UCMJ, arts. 27, 38.
3'UCMfJ, art. 3i(a).
40UCMJ, art. 3 (d).
"1UCMJ, art. 52(c).
'3 UCMJ, art. 5 2(a).OUCMJ, art. 52(b).
"UCMJ, arts. 66, 67.43United States v. Clay, supra note 33, at 77-78. (Footnotes 34-44 added.)
411d. at 77.
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given the same effect that courts accord the rights of civilian defen-
dants under the Constitution.4 7
In United States v. Rawdon,4s the Court of Military Appeals stated
that "a denial of due process exists when an accused is tried under
such circumstances as to violate the standards of fundamental fairness
which are part of American criminal law."4 9 Consistent with this ap-
proach, the court has also protected the accused from unreasonable
search and seizure, 50 and from being compelled to give evidence
against himself.51 And the court in 1957 insured the accused of the
right to the assistance of counsel, not only at his trial, but also in the
pre-trial interrogation.5
2
Significantly, in the areas of self-incrimination and assistance of
counsel at pre-trial interrogation, the Court of Military Appeals acted
prior to action by the United States Supreme Court.53 "Proceeding
from the basic premise of applicability of the United States Consti-
tution to members of the Armed Forces, the Court has on numerous
occasions enforced the rights which fiave their source in the Consti-
tution." 4 It thus appears that there is a strong tendency to congruity
,
7Ibid.
49 U.S.C.M.A. 396, 26 C.M.R. 176 (1958).
"Id. at 397.
OUnited States v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 26o (1963); United States
v. Brown, io U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28 C.M.R. 48 (1959); MGM, 1951, 152.
"United States v. Kemp, 13 US.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962); United States
v. Walker, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 187, 25 C.M.R. 449 (1958). See UCMJ, art. 31. The privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination has been extended to prohibit the intro-
duction into evidence of nonconsenually obtained body fluids and handwriting
samples. United States v. (Hill, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 9, 30 C.M.R. 9, (196) (blood-alcohol
test); United States v. McClung, i U.S.C.M.A. 754, 29 C.M.R. 570 (1966) (urine speci-
men); United States v. Minnifield, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 373, 26 C.M.R. 153 (1958) (hand-
writing sample).
5eUnited States v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957)- See UCMJ,
art. 32. (pre-trial investigation).
rThe United States Supreme Court did not interpret the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to extend the privilege against self-incrimination to the states until 1964.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The right to counsel at "pre-trial" proceed-
ings was similarly effected in 1964. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). "It is
abundantly clear that defendants before military tribunals are, by law, provided with
and shielded by a mantle of valuable protection extending to areas but recently the
subject of discussion by the Supreme Court." United States v. Culp, supra note
32 at 203. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
'ig6o C.M.A. Ann. Rep. 9. The Court has recognized the "constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech, limited by reason...." Id. See United States
v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 5og, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954). The Court of Military Appeals
has often interpreted the rights of the accused according to guidelines established
by United States Supreme Court decisions. E.g., United States v. Culp, supra note
32; United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958).
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of a civilian defendant's rights under the Constitution as defined by
the Supreme Court and a military accused's rights under the Uniform
Code as defined by the Court of Military Appeals. 53
In United States v. Kraskouskas,56 the Court of Military Appeals
held that counsel for the accused in a general court-martial must be a
lawyer. The court stated:
We are not unmindful that in the past those representing the
adversary interest before a military court-martial were often
nonlawyers who performed very creditable service on behalf of
their clients. Nevertheless, the obvious truth-with which none
can quarrel-is that one untrained in the law is seriously handi-
capped by the lack of professional skill and legal ability which
is so necessary in adversary proceedings, especially involving
criminal matters. To the nonlawyer rules of evidence mean lit-
tle and instructions are but unimportant technicalities. To the
lawyer, however, they are tools which oftentimes spell the differ-
ence between success and failure.
57
In Kraskouskas, the court interpreted the term "counsel" in Ar-
tide 27(b), which deals with general courts-martial,
58 to mean only a
lawyer admitted to the bar. To interpret the accused's right to counsel
in special courts-martial to include the right to lawyer counsel would
involve more than interpreting the meaning of the word "counsel."
Article 27(c), which deals with special courts-martial, provides only
that if the trial counsel (prosecutor) is a lawyer or certified as general
court-martial (lawyer) counsel, the defense counsel must be formally
equivalently qualified. 59 Article 27(c) does not affirmatively provide for
a lawyer as either trial or defense counsel. To provide that the accused
in a special court-martial is entitled to lawyer counsel would involve
changing the clear meaning of the Uniform Code, rather than merely
interpreting its meaning. The court has been unwilling to do this be-
cause the power to make the procedural safeguards of the Uniform
Code more stringent rests with the President of the United States. Ar-
ticle 36 of the Uniform Code states that the President may prescribe
rules for the conduct of courts-martial; such rules are found in the
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951, 60 which provides that any officer
can be appointed as trial or defense counsel in special courts-martial.
I See Warren, The Bill of Rights And The Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 181, 197
(1962).
59 U.S.C.M.A. 6o7, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958).
11d. at 6io.
"UCMJ, art. 27(b).
'OUCMJ, art. 27(c) provides, in essence, that if trial counsel is a lawyer, de-
fense counsel must also be a lawyer.
eThe MCM (1951) was issued as E.O. No. 10214, 16 F.R. 1303, Feb. 8, 1951. The
Manual is also a separately bound volume.
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The Manual does not require that defense counsel be a lawyer ex-
cept as provided in Article 27(c).61
Therefore, the Court of Military Appeals would have to declare
that the practice of refusing lawyer counsel to the accused in special
courts is unconstitutional. While the Court has been willing to inter-
pret the Uniform Code through the use of Constitutional precepts
it has been reluctant to declare a portion of the Code which created
the Court itself62 unconstitutional.63
Even though unwilling either to legislate judicially or to declare
a portion of the Uniform Code unconstitutional, the Court of Military
Appeals has acted in this area by establishing exacting standards for
defense counsel, lawyer or nonlawyer. 64 In United States v. McMa-
01MCM, 1951, 6c.
CUCMJ. art. 67.
6qn United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954), the Court
of Military Appeals summarily dismissed the accused's contention that court-
martial jurisdiction did not extend to civiliani dependents of members of the Armed
Forces who accompanied them abroad. See UCMJ, art. 2(11). The court relied on
United States v. Garcia, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 17 C.M.R. 88 (1954)- In Garcia, the court
affirmed court-martial jurisdiction without considering constitutional principles,
basing its decision on the relationship between the civilian employee and the mili-
tary. The court held that the basic purpose of UCMJ, art. 2(11) was to provide
for a "system of law administration for civilians who accompany our Armed
Forces overseas." Id. at ioo. The Court of Military Appeals held that absent court-
martial jurisdiction (i) these civilians could not be dealt with by military authori-
ties; (2) that foreign policy reasons dictated military control of civilians accom-
panying the military; and (3) that the jurisdiction of the host foreign nation would
as a practical matter necessitate foreign jurisdiction over civilian offenders. Id.
at ioo.
The United States Supreme Court invalidated UCMJ, art.' 2(1) in Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Supreme Court that "under our Constitution courts
of law alone are given power to try civilians for their offenses against the United
States." Id. at 40-41.
Three years later the Supreme Court extended the application of Reid to pre-
clude the applicability of UCMJ, art. 2(11) to civilians charged with non-capital
offenses. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (196o). This
case was previously considered by the Court of Military Appeals in United States
v. Dial, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 541, 26 C.M.R. 321 (1958). The court held that UCMJ, art.
2(11) was applicable to civilians charged with non-capital offenses. Id. at 542.
Therefore, the Court of Military Appeals, given the opportunity to extend its
scope of Reid (capital offenses), declined to invalidate a provision of the UCM:J as
unconstitutional.
"E.G., United States v. Broy, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 419,34 C.M.R. 199 (1964); United
States v. Rosenblatt, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 28, 32 C.M.R. 28 (1962); United States v. Huff.
ii U.S.CM.A. 397, 29 C.M.R. 213 (ig6o). "In this regard, it should be pointed out
that the high standard of advocacy set by this court for all courts-martial applies
alike to all non-lawyer defense counsel and counsel trained and experienced in the
law. In no other way can effective assistance of counsel be meaningful within the
general purpose of guaranteeing a fair trial to all those tried by courts-martial."
Letter from Alfred C. Proulx, Clerk of the Court of Military Appeals, to Robert E.
Payne, Dec. 16, 1965.
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han,6 5 the court, recognizing that competency of counsel was inherent
in the right to counsel, stated that "the uniformed accused, as well as
his civilian counterpart, is... justly entitled to receive from his at-
torney a full measure of assistance."66
The court held in Kraskouskas:
The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is not
concerned with merely a procedural requirement but also de-
mands a professional and requisite standard of skill. A fair
standard of professional competence must be a necessary condi-
tion precedent with the professional undertaking of the defense
of a person on trial for a crime.
67
It is obvious that the court is aware of the problems which non-lawyer
defense counsel presents.68 It approached this problem of insuring
that defense counsel conforms to high standards in conducting the
defense, by holding that failure to conform to these standards will re-
sult in reversal.6 9
Failure of defense counsel to move for a continuance when ap-
propriate, failure to make an opening or closing statement, failure to
examine any member of the court-martial on voir dire may constitute
reversible error.1 0 The court has held that defense counsel's obligation
to the accused includes an attempt to obtain a just sentence. 71 De-
fense counsel is obligated to present all evidence which might material-
ly affect the outcome of the case72 and defense counsel's failure to pre-
sent circumstances in mitigation and extenuation has been held fatal
error.73 The court has also held that any conflict of interest on the
part of defense counsel may constitute reversible error, even though he
acted in good faith.74
The Court of Military Appeals seems willing to apply Constitu-
066 U.S.CM.A. 709, 21 C.M.R. 31 (1956).
11d. at 717. (Emphasis added.)
"United States v. Kraskouskas, supra note 56, at 61o.
"What makes the problem particularly difficult is that we are dealing with
both sophisticated aspects of the law and persons who are untrained in the law."
United States v. Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 50, 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958).
6'E.g., United States v. Cutting, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 347, 34 C.M.R. 127 (1964);
United States v. McMahan, supra note 65, at 72o. However, the burden to prove
inadequate representation falls on the accused. United States v. Hunter, 2 U.S.C.M.A.
37, 41, 6 C.M.R. 37 (1952)-
-'United States v. McMahan, supra note 65.
-'United States v. Broy, supra note 64.
"2United States v. Rosenblatt, supra note 64.
7United States v. Huff, supra note 64.
-'United States v. Lovett, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 704, 23 C.M.R. 168 (1957). Defense
counsel in Lovett had previously acted in another trial as defense counsel for a
co-accused and that co-accused was a witness for the prosecution against Lovett.
The court found a possible conflict of interest.
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tional principles as interpreted by the Supreme Court to give greater
meaning to the rights of the accused.75 A cursory examination of re-
cent United States Supreme Court decisions on the right to counsel
indicates that the right to lawyer counsel inheres in the contemporary
concept of the right to counsel.76
The Gideon-Escobedo line of cases establishes that "counsel" means
a lawyer, not merely a person to champion the defendant's cause or to
lend him moral support.77 Although Gideon is not without limita-
tion,78 it is patent that the right to counsel is a fundamental right in-
herent in the contemporary concept of a "fair trial."70
This concept seems to be what Judge Christensen was pointing to
in Stapley when he stated:
In sum it appears appropriate, timely and necessary to recog-
nize that it may be repugnant to minimal requirements of due
process, even in the military service, for the juridicially blind
to lead the blind under a system or in a particular command
accepting this [nonlawyer counsel] as a rule rather than a mili-
tarily necessitated exception; that the fiat of an appointment
of 'defense counsel,' a military commission, a presidential ap-
pointment or even an act of the Congress cannot itself satisfy
the demands of the Sixth Amendment that in all criminal prose-
cutions the accused is "to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense"; that this assistance of counsel, however, adaptably we
many interpret the term in view of military expediency, can-
not be constitutionally debased to mean the substantial absence
of any legal assistance, the mere shell or shadow of counsel or
no more than a semantic illusion; and that the military service
in these respects may not be considered a constitutionally unin-
habitable wasteland beyond even the scan of the Great Writ
where the court is powerless to reach out a protective hand.80
The Court of Military Appeals recognizes that the ideal situation
would be to provide lawyer counsel for every accused, but it has temp-
ered this recognition with the realization that to do so would be a prac-
tical impossibility.8 1 The argument of practicability involves such
i96o C.M.A. Ann. Rep. 9.
,'Stapley does not require lawyer counsel in all special courts; however, it seems
to point to such a requirement in all "serious" cases. The issue involved is not
the fact that the accused may not be indigent as indicated in United States v.
CuIp, supra note 32., at 202, but that the right to counsel is a fundamental right
which is meaningless unless counsel is trained in law.
Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 53; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
"See Hall 8 Kamisar, Modem Criminal Procedure 81-88 (1965).
"See Kamisar, Inbau 8: Arnold, Criminal Justice in Our Time 4-95 (1965)•
Application of Stapley, supra note 2, at 322.
"United States v. Hunter, supra note 69, at 41.
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valid considerations as the necessity for an effective system of discipline
and the availability of personnel.82 The Supreme Court held in Burns
v. Wilson8s that the responsibility for striking the "precise balance"
between military exigencies and the rights of military personnel lies
with Congress.8 4 Commenting on Burns, Chief Justice Warren said
that "our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights
simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes."8
Concerning practicability the court in Stapley stated:
[W]ith the increasing personnel in the military service, the rap-
idity and ease of transportation and the training facilities and
techniques readily available for specialized training or experi-
ence, it is no longer either reasonable or necessary, if it ever
were, to deem any officer qualified to act as defense counsel for
an accused merely because he is an officer; nor is it either
reasonable or necessary to limit the availability of qualified
defense counsel to cases in which the prosecution is represented
by qualified counsel.... [A]n accused has the right to be rea-
sonably advised concerning charges even though they are filed
inadvisedly and prosecuted unintelligently, and in the latter
event sometimes he needs qualified counsel all the more.80
Stapley perhaps oversimplifies the solution to the problem of prac-
ticability, but it does point to the fact that defense counsel, whether
lawyer or non-lawyer, should be thoroughly acquainted with the law
and legal procedures in order to assure a fair trial.
It is possible that the present system represents the proper balance
between military necessity and due process, and that, as Stapley sug-
gests, lawyer counsel should be required in special courts-martial only
in cases involving serious moral turpitude offenses and substantial
deprivation of liberty. That the present system is adequate to conform
to Constitutional standards of due process is doubtful.
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'A discussion of the many immediate and tangential problems in this area
is beyond the scope of this comment. It is sufficient to say that these considerations
are important enough to be considered in formulating any solution to the prob-
lem.
'Burns v. Wilson, 346 US. 137 (1953).
14d. at 140. Burns involved two petitioners who were tried and convicted of
murder and rape and sentenced to death. The petitioners alleged that military
authorities had detained them illegally, coerced confessions from them, and denied
them counsel of their choice. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
85Warren, supra note 55, at 188 (discussing Burns v. Wilson).
"Application of Stapley, supra note 2, at 321.
87When there is "an assertion of substantial violation of a precept of the Bill
of Rights, a most extraordinary showing of military necessity in defense of the
Nation has been required for the Court to conclude that the challenged action in
fact squared with the injunctions of the Constitution. While situations may arise
in which deference by the Court is compelling, the cases in which this has occurred
CASE COMMENTS
Stapley's "serious charges" criterion suggests that it may be wise
to revise the punitive articles of the Uniform Codes s by segregating
serious offenses into "criminal violations" and either limiting the
trial of these "criminal violations" to general courts-martial, in
which lawyer counsel are required; or by providing lawyer counsel
in special courts-martial. All other violations could be termed "dis-
ciplinary" especially since adequate punishment now appears to be
provided for under the non-judicial punishment provision of the
Uniform Code.8 9
Any fair appraisal of the rights of the accused shows clearly that
the military through the Uniform Code and the Court of Military
Appeals has made significant progress in assuring the accused a fair
trial.90 The armed services have themselves established courses to train
non-lawyer counsel0 ' and have already taken action which hopefully
will "prevent, insofar as practicable, a recurrence of cases like the
Stapley case." 92 The Court of Military Appeals has been extremely ef-
fective, insofar as is possible by judicial action, in insuring that mili-
tary law conforms to contemporary standards of fairness.93
The right to effective counsel is fundamental to a fair criminal
trial, civilian or military. The factors of practicability and availability
may preclude providing lawyer counsel to the accused in special courts-
martial. If this is true, then defense counsel should be a person well
trained 94 in the substance and procedure of courts-martial.
Because the area of military justice is peculiarly within the pur-
view of Congressional action, Congress should reconsider the accused's
demonstrate that such a restriction upon the scope of review is pregnant with dan-
ger to individual freedom." Warren, supra note 55, at 197-
.UCMJ, articles 83-134.
1UCMJ, art. 15. Such a provision would require extensive consideration and
careful segregation of offenses because one of the primary objections to pre-Uniform
Code military justices was the presence of command influence in the conduct of
courts-martial. 2 U.S. Code Cong. Ser. 2222, 2227 (1950); 196o C.M.A. Ann. Rep.
5. It is mandatory that command influence in courts-martial continue to be ex-
cluded.
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